主讲人

（单位）

周高光

（香港浸会大学）

主持人

（单位）

潘健平、黄泽悦

（东南大学）

讲座时间

2026年4月27日（周一）9：30

讲座地点

经管楼B203会议室

主讲人简介

周高光博士，管理会计师，香港浸会大学商学院会计学副教授，博士生导师，工商管理硕士项目(MBA)副主任。他的研究领域涉及审计，文化和公司财务，企业社会责任等多个领域，在包括Journal of Accounting and Economics, Management Science, Journal of International Business Studies, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory以及Journal of Corporate Finance等期刊上发表三十逾篇论文。周博士在2019年出版第一本亚洲企业可持续发展英文专著。他目前担任国际著名期刊Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics的副主编以及Journal of Business Research的企业社会责任方向的编委。

讲座内容摘要

This study examines the effects of suppliers' board voting regimes on customer–supplier relationships. Exploiting the staggered adoption of majority voting (MV) legislation across U.S. states as a quasi-natural experiment, we document a statistically and economically significant decline in supplier sales to major customers following MV enactment in the states where suppliers are located. This decline aligns with the disruption hypothesis, which posits that MV-induced board instability increases customers' perceived risks and weakens relational ties. Additional tests show that MV adoption in customers' states has no significant effect, indicating that the documented decline is driven by supplier-side shocks rather than customer-side factors. Mechanism analyses reveal that the effect is amplified by higher turnover of long-tenured and well-connected directors, consistent with disruptions to board structure increasing uncertainty. Cross-sectional tests further show that the negative effect is stronger for suppliers with higher information asymmetry and weaker financial performance, as well as in relationships characterized by higher R&D intensity. On the customer side, the effect is mitigated by switching costs but is more pronounced for risk-averse customers in durable goods and manufacturing industries. Overall, our study provides novel evidence that director election reforms impose externalities on supply chains, highlighting the importance of board stability in sustaining interfirm relationships.