讲座题目 | Platform Certification and Consumer Verification | ||
主讲人 (单位) | 李娇阳 (印第安纳大学教授) | 主持人 (单位) | 高星 (东南大学) |
讲座时间 | 2026年1月15日 9:00 | 在线 | #腾讯会议:681-556-270 |
主讲人简介 |
李娇阳是印第安纳大学凯利商学院市场营销学讲席正教授、博士项目主任。她的研究聚焦于通过理解消费者行为与应用新技术来提升企业营销策略,并为政策制定提供支持,以推动“更好的营销,创造更美好的世界”。她的论文发表在 Marketing Science、Management Science、Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Marketing, Production and Operations Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, and Strategic Management Journal 等国际顶级期刊,她也在多个顶级期刊担任副主编,并多次获得学术荣誉与副主编奖项。 | ||
讲座内容摘要 | The rise of e-commerce platforms has brought public concerns about the quality of products sold on platforms by third-party sellers. In response, many platforms have launched certification programs to endorse selected sellers. Consumers are increasingly gaining access to tools that enable them to independently verify product quality. This raises two key questions: How should platforms design certification programs and set commission rates when consumers either have or lack the ability to verify products? Furthermore, how do the two quality assurance mechanisms—platform certification and consumer verification—interact with sellers' price signaling to shape market outcomes? We address these questions using a Bayesian persuasion framework to analyze the platform's information design, accounting for these strategic interplays. Our analysis reveals three key insights: First, when consumers lack verification tools, the platform may intentionally withhold sellers' quality information in its certification design. As the opportunity cost for sellers to join the platform increases, the platform adjusts the informativeness of certification and the commission rate in a nonmonotonic manner. Second, introducing consumer verification can trigger high-quality sellers to signal quality by distorting prices upward, inducing the platform to implement a fully transparent certification program to mitigate price distortions. Third, although both certification and verification enhance market transparency, they are not necessarily beneficial. Platform certification may harm consumers and society when consumers lack verification tools. Empowering consumers with verification tools can be detrimental to not only the platform and sellers but also consumers and society. | ||

